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Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson
4.1 Introduction
Trying to understand why mortality is so strongly related to socioeco-
nomic status (SES) has been a major concern in demography, epidemiol-
ogy, and public health for many years, and is beginning to attract the atten-
tion of economists. Data from the National Longitudinal Mortality Study
(NLMS) show that people aged twenty-ﬁve whose family income was
$5,000 or less in 1980 (and in 1980 prices) could expect to live ten years
less than those whose family income was more than $50,000 (Rogot et al.
1992). The concept of SES is more widely used outside economics than
within it, and one of the issues that remains to be settled is the extent to
which these health diﬀerences are caused by income or by other factors
correlated with income, education being the most obvious (see, e.g., Fuchs
1989, 1993; Garber 1989). Many writers believe that there is at least some
direct protective eﬀecto fincome, and in a recent literature much identiﬁed
with the work of Richard Wilkinson (1996), it is argued that, while the
ﬁrst moment of income is protective, at least at the individual level, the
second moment is a health hazard, so that income inequality raises mortal-
ity, if not at the individual level at least in populations or large subpopula-
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129tions. Wilkinson distinguishes his hypothesis from the mechanical conse-
quence of Jensen’s inequality, that a convex relationship between mortality
risk and dying means that aggregate mortality will be higher in more un-
equal societies. Instead he postulates that inequality itself is a health haz-
arda nd that it is less healthy for both rich and poor to live in a more un-
equal society. It is hardly necessary to emphasize the importance of such a
link, if it indeed exists, though economists are particularly likely to mourn
the loss of the Pareto criterion. The proponents of some changes, such as
improvement in school quality, or raising the return on social security,
make a plausible case that such changes will make everyone better oﬀ,
though some more so than others. If such changes increase inequality, as
almost certainly they would, the cost of lives lost would have to be oﬀset
against the economic beneﬁts.
Theo riginal empirical support for the Wilkinson hypotheses comes
from Wilkinson’s cross-country comparisons within the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), where some measures
of inequality are much more closely related to mortality levels and mortal-
ity changes than is either the level or rate of growth of national income.
There are also a number of studies in the United States that ﬁnd a relation-
ship across states between income inequality and mortality (see Kaplan
et al. 1996; Kennedy, Kawachi, and Prothrow-Stith 1996). Although this
work has been challenged on a number of grounds (e.g., Judge 1995; Fis-
cella and Franks 1997; Mellor and Milyo 1998), and in some cases has
been substantially modiﬁed( see Judge, Mulligan, and Benzeval 1998; Mc-
Isaac and Wilkinson 1997; Lobmayer and Wilkinson 1999), what was ini-
tially perceived as implausible seems most recently to be commanding ac-
ceptance from careful and unbiased researchers in the ﬁeld (e.g., Marmot
1997 and the survey by Robert and House 1999). While we have reserva-
tionsa bout the robustness of many of the positive ﬁndings, our main pur-
pose in this paper is not to try to come to judgment based on the review
of the evidence—we suspect that it is too early to try to do so—but to
oﬀer some new evidence based on income, income inequality, and mortal-
ityd ataf or birth cohorts of Americans observed over the two decades
from 1975 to 1995. As far as we are aware, birth cohorts have not pre-
viously been used in this context—as opposed to individual data, state
data, or country data—and unlike these other sources, they oﬀer both a
cross-sectional and time series dimension in the same data.
Then ext section of the paper summarizes and substantially extends a
simple model ﬁrst developed in an earlier paper by one of us (Deaton
2001). The model is designed to provide a framework for empirical appli-
cation,a nd provides a way of thinking about the eﬀects of income and
income inequality in a framework in which causality runs from income to
health, but where it is not absolute income that matters for health, but
income relative to the average of an (unobservable) reference group. Al-
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groups are not observed means that the slope of the observed relationship
between health and income varies with the ratio of between- to within-
group inequality. The model can be readily extended to incorporate a di-
rect eﬀecto finequality by making health depend on the absolute size of
income diﬀerences within the reference group, but equally plausible speci-
ﬁcations give diﬀerent results so that, according to the theory, income in-
equality can be either protective or hazardous. We give detailed consider-
ation to the aggregation of the relationship between health and income,
and how it can be expected to change as it is examined with diﬀerent
sources of data, such as individual records, averages of states or countries,
or averages of birth cohorts.
Section 4.3 presents our empirical evidence. Data on mortality for birth
cohorts are combined with data on income, income inequality, poverty,
and education for 1975 through 1995 from each successive Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS) from 1976 to 1996. Deaton’s (1999) preliminary anal-
ysis used the same general approach, but worked with a shorter sample
period (1981–93), diﬀerent timing, and a more limited range of variables,
and merged the mortality and CPS data on a household basis rather than
on the much more satisfactory individual basis used here. Deaton found
that income reduced the risk of mortality, and that while the slope of the
gradient was steepened when inequality was higher, there was no direct
eﬀecto finequality at the mean. In the current paper, we again document
the strongly protective eﬀects of income, and we examine how those eﬀects
vary at diﬀerent points in the life cycle. When we turn to inequality, we
noto nly fail to ﬁnd that it increases the risk of mortality, but we ﬁnd that
there is actually a protective eﬀect, in apparent contradiction noto n l yw ith
the Wilkinson hypothesis but with much of the theory developed in this
paper. Theb asis for the result is the fact that when mortality was falling
the most rapidly, in the late 1970s and early 1980s (years not included in
the preliminary study), inequality of income was also rising rapidly. Note
that because the mortality and inequality changes aﬀected so many birth
cohorts simultaneously, our results are based on more than a correlation
foraf ew years of data. It is hard to understand why, if income inequality is
so important in explaining mortality diﬀerences across states in the United
States, as well as diﬀerences between the United States and other devel-
oped countries, mortality should have fallen most rapidly just when in-
equality was rising most rapidly.
We also give a good deal of attention to the role of education, whether
income is a mask for education, how income and education aﬀectm o rtal-
ityi nthe cross-section and over time, and whether the treatment of income
and education aﬀects our results on the role of inequality. In a cross-
section of birth cohorts, income and education are closely correlated so
that, in order to disentangle their eﬀects, we rely on the time series dimen-
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NLMS. The individual-level data show that both income and education
ares eparately protective against mortality and that only some of the eﬀect
of income is removed when we attemptt oallow for reverse causality from
nearing death to income. In the cohort data, by contrast, income appears
to increase the risk of mortality conditional on education, a result that
we tentatively ascribe to the short-run or business-cycle eﬀects of income
on mortality.
4.2 Income, Health, and Inequality
The public health and epidemiological literatures, although richly sug-
gestive of mechanisms, do not currently provide a precise characterization
of the way in which inequality aﬀects health. In consequence, it is diﬃcult
to know how to test the model, or how to interpret results. In this paper,
we start from the framework in Deaton (2001), and show how it can be
used as a basis for empirical analysis of individual level as well as aggre-
gated data. The model is one in which the link runs from income to health,
although, in this context, there is nothing to stop the reinterpretation of
“income” as years of schooling so that, for the moment, we are not ad-
dressing the issue of whether it is income or education that is ultimately
protective. However, we are not considering reverse causation, from health
to income, a link that undoubtedly plays a part, although only a part, in
accounting for the relationship between income and health. That income
should cause health through a health Engel curve is consistent with stan-
dard health capital approaches in economics in which health is produced
with health care and behavioral inputs that have to compete with leisure
and other expenditures for a limited budget of time and money. However,
identiﬁable health behaviors appear to explain only about a quarter of the
relationship between health and income (Marmot 1994; Lantz et al. 1998),
and medical care probably a good deal less, perhaps 10 percent or so (Ad-
lere tal. 1993; House and Williams 1995), so that this approach does not
seemv ery promising. Perhaps the most promising line of investigation im-
plicates the biochemical eﬀects of psychosocial stress as a risk factor, link-
ing thisstresstosocialstatus;see,for example,Sapolsky(1993),Cohen,Ty-
rell,and Smith (1991), and Cohen et al. (1997) for some of the results, and
Sapolsky (1996) and Adler et al. (1992) for reviews.
In the spirit of this work, suppose that health status (measured posi-
tively)i sa nincreasing function of income relative to the average income
in the reference group to which the individual belongs. Write h forh e alth,
y for (the logarithm of) individual income, and z for the mean (logarithm
of) income in the reference group. Once again, note that we are using
income as a measure of social status, which could just as well be thought
of as education, or as any other (absolute) measure of achievement. We
assume that the relationship is linear, so that for 0,
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If we knew the reference group to which each individual belonged, we
could estimate equation (1) directly using individual-level data. However,
such information is rarely available, and there can be no presumption that
individuals relate to any clearly identiﬁable group, such as neighbors, birth
cohorts, or members of the same educational or occupational groups.
Health may be determined by status at work, status in the local (geograph-
ical) community, or status at church or in some community organization.
As a result, z must be treated as an unobservable, and health conditioned
only on (own) income, so that equation (1) becomes
(2) Ehy y Ezy (|) [ (|)]. =+ − 
Thec onditional expectation on the right-hand side of equation (2) can be
calculated from knowledge of the joint distribution of z and y.G iven the
linear structure, the most convenient assumptions are that z and y are joint
normally distributed (recall that incomes are measured in logarithms). We
write the marginal distribution of z as N(, 2
z), and the distribution of y
conditional on z as N(z, 2
ε), so that 2
ε and 2
z arem e asures of within-
reference-group and between-reference-group inequality, respectively.
Given the normality assumptions and the linearity of the original expec-
tation, the expectation of health conditional on income takes the conve-














so that the slope of the “gradient,” the relationship between health and
income, is a function of the ratio of within-group to between-group in-
equality. When reference groups are internally homogeneous relative to
the disparity across groups, diﬀerences in individual income largely reﬂect
intergroup disparity, which is irrelevant for health, so that the eﬀect of
income is attenuated. When inequality within reference groups is relatively
high, individual income is a good indicator of relative income, and a good
predictor of health. Another useful way of thinking about equation (3) is
that income is an error-ridden estimate of relative income, so that the slope
of the regression function is attenuated in the usual way. Note, however,
that the convenient form in equation (3) depends, not only on the linearity
of equation (1), but also the normality assumptions about reference-group
and within-reference-group incomes.
Equation (3) does not assign to inequality any direct role in the determi-
nation of health. To the extent that changes in inequality change the rela-
tionship between intragroup and intergroup inequality, the observed rela-
tionship between health and income will become more or less steep. Yet
even here, there is no structural eﬀecto finequality on health. For example,
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come less healthy, and some more healthy, but the average health of each
group will not change. If intergroup inequality changes, leaving intragroup
inequality the same, no one’s health changes, even though the relationship
between health and income changes. The gradient is driven, not by
changes in health, but by changes with inequality in the relative income
composition of each absolute income group.
Ther elative income model can be extended to incorporate a direct role
for inequality. In some of the literature, there are suggestions that it is the
absolute income diﬀerences that matter, so that each person’s health is
determined by, for example, the diﬀerence between their income and the
income of the best-oﬀ person in the reference group. If the best-oﬀ person
is  standard deviations from the group mean, health responds, not to the
diﬀerence between y and z,b u tt othe diﬀerence between y and z   ε,
so that equation (1) becomes
(4) Ehyz y z (|,) ( ) . =+ −−    ε
Following through the argument as before, and assuming that εis orthog-
onal to income, gives a new version of equation (3),
(5) Ehy y
z











so that inequality plays a direct negative role on health as well as playing
the indirect role originally assigned to it. This appears much closer to the
kind ofe ﬀect discussed by Wilkinson (1996) and of much of the related lit-
erature.
However, this account of inequality and health contains no fundamental
reason that the eﬀect not be negative. In the original equation (1), individ-
ual health depends on relative income, so that a mean preserving spread
of income within the reference group hurts some but helps others, so aver-
ageh e alth is unaﬀected. In the modiﬁed equation, people are hurt by their
distance from the tops of their reference groups, so that a mean preserving
spread hurts everyone except the person at the top, who is unaﬀected, and
the healthiness of the group falls. Yet this is not the only way of measuring
relative income eﬀects. Instead of looking to the top, people might look to
the bottom, and become healthier the further they are above the reference
group ﬂoor. Just as in the upward-looking model, health is determined by
relative standing, and both approaches seem equally consistent with ﬁnd-
ings that people with higher social status are healthier. The downward
looking speciﬁcation, however, gives exactly the opposite eﬀecto finequal-
ityo nh ealth. A mean preserving spread improves everyone’s health except
that of the poorest person, which remains unchanged, and the group be-
comes healthier. This model leads to exactly the same functional form as
134 Angus Deaton and Christina Paxsonequations (4) and (5), but with the sign on the last term reversed. Without
more content, linking health to relative economic status delivers no predic-
tion for the direction of the eﬀecto finequality on health.
Ambiguous though it may be, equation (5) is a convenient basis for em-
pirical estimation, at least on individual-level data. Health is linearly re-
lated to income, to inequality, and to an interaction term between inequal-
itya nd income. For the analysis of individual level data, equation (5) can
be used directly—for example, as a probit or logit. Taking the former as
an example, suppose that someone dies when h falls below some critical
level h0, then the probability of death is















where  is the cumulative density function of the standard normal, u is
the standard deviation of health conditional on income (see equation [15]),























Note that the within-reference-group inequality term 	 is being taken as
ac o nstant and absorbed into the intercept; even though we do not know
the reference groups, or their mean incomes, we may have a proxy for
reference group inequality—such as inequality over some observable
group—in which case 	 could be included as a variable.
Although there are a number of microeconomic data sets on which
equation (6) might be estimated, from one of which we will show results
below, we are faced with the usual choices in work linking health and
economics: between data sets that are rich on economic measures but poor
on health, and data sets that are strong on health but weak on economics.
One way of solving the dilemma is to merge information from multiple
data sets, not at the level of the individual, but at the level of some group
that is represented in more than one survey. In this paper, we group at the
levelo fbirth cohorts observed in a particular year, and we merge mortality
data from the vital registration system with income, income inequality, and
education data from the CPS. Before discussing the empirical results, we
therefore need to consider the eﬀects of cohort-level aggregation on equa-
tion (5). We do this in a fairly general way, so as to allow other kinds of
aggregation (e.g., by occupation, or by region). Since some of the previous
worko ninequality and health has used either state-level or international
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sults.
Return to equation (4) in the form
(9) Ehyz y z (|,) ( ) =+ − −  ε
and suppose that we observe neither y nor z,b u ts o m ec o n d i t ional average,
denoted x.I no u rempirical work, x is the average (log) income of a birth
cohort in a particular year, but it might just as well be an average condi-
tioned on state or occupation. Conditional on x, y is N(x, 2
c), where c
refers to the aggregation group. If x is jointly normally distributed with
both y and z,w i t hc o m m o nm e a n, then the expectation of h conditional













where zx is the covariance of x and z,m ean incomes in aggregation and
reference groups, respectively. Once again, we have assumed that the
within-reference-group inequality ε is orthogonal to the aggregation
group income. Equation (10) is analogous to equation (5) and both come
from projection of the fundamental behavioral relationship in equation (1)
onto diﬀerent variables. They are identical if each person is her or his
owna ggregation group, so that individual income y and group income z
coincide. More generally, however, equations (10) and (5) are diﬀerent; the
bias to the slope now depends, not on the ratio of within- to between-
reference-groupvariance,but(negatively)onzx/2
x,theslopeoftheregres-
sion of reference group on aggregation group income. When aggregation
group income moves one-for-one with reference group income, as when the
referenceandaggregation groups coincide, the relationship between health
and group income is lost. To get an unattenuated slope, we need to select
aggregation groups whose average incomes are uncorrelated with reference
group incomes.
Some examples clarify the implications of equation (10). While in prin-
ciple it is possible for health to be negatively related to income at the
aggregation group level, this seems unlikely in practice. Consider a compo-
nent model of income, written as
(11) y atg =+ + + +  
  ε ,
where, as always,  is the grand mean, and the other components are zero-
mean random terms associated with the eﬀects of age (a), time (t), occupa-
tional group (g), and an individual idiosyncratic term. In Case A, suppose
that the reference group is people of the same age, in the same occupation,
today. In Case B, the reference group is all members of the profession
136 Angus Deaton and Christina Paxsontoday, irrespective of age. In both cases, the aggregation groups are birth
cohorts, people of the same age today, so that the aggregation group in-
come is  a 
 t.I nCase A, the reference income is the sum of the
ﬁrst four terms on the right-hand side of equation (11), so that y  z is
simply the idiosyncratic residual 	 which, by assumption, is orthogonal to
z,s ot h a tthe coeﬃcient on x in equation (10) is zero. In terms of that
equation, asi se a s i l ychecked, we have
(12) cov var (,) , xz x zx a t x ==+== 
222
so that x has no eﬀecti nthe regression, and aggregation group income
does notp redict aggregation group health. Even though income predicts
health in the microdata, only inequality predicts health in the aggregate.
Case B is diﬀerent. Because the age component is included in aggregation
group income, but not in reference group income, the covariance of x and
z is only 2
















so that aggregation group income matters for aggregation group health,
albeit with an attenuated eﬀect. In this case, there will be attenuation ex-
cept in the implausible case where 2
t 
 0a nd there are no common aggre-
gate shocks to income.
In general, if the reference groups are more ﬁnely deﬁned than the aggre-
gation groups (e.g., economists of the same age observed at the same time
versus an age cohort), aggregation will annihilate the relationship between
income and health in the aggregated data. If neither group is more ﬁnely
deﬁned—economists of all ages versus birth cohorts—or if the reference
group is less ﬁnely deﬁned than the aggregation group—the whole popula-
tion versus birth cohorts—income of the aggregation groups will predict
average health in the aggregation groups. Note that if the reference group
is the whole population, so that reference group income is the population
mean, the covariance of x and z is zero so that, by equation (10), there is
no attenuation, and the microeconomic relationship carries through di-
rectly to the aggregate relationship. Finally, if the aggregation groups are
individuals, so that x 
 y,i ti se asily checked that equation (10) reduces
to the attenuated microrelationship equation (5). This kind of analysis
seems to capture some (although not all) of the discussion in Wilkinson
(1997), who argues that looking across small geographical areas, income
will be more important than inequality, while the opposite will be true in
comparisons over aggregates for large areas, such as states or regions.
In applications such as the present, where health is measured only to
the extent that it does or does not fall beneath a threshold and results in
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scale,w here the scale is the standard deviation of health around the two
regression equations (5) and (10). As was the case for the slopes, the resid-
ual variances come from standard results on the normal distribution. If we
write 2
h for the variance of health conditional on both y and z in equation


















When the model is estimated on group-aggregated data, here on age co-
horts, the slope of the income relationship should be the ratio of (1 
zx/2
x)t othe square root of equation (14). In the microdata, correspond-
ing to equation (4), equation (14) also holds but with x 















Unfortunately, without knowledge of the variances, there is no general
inequality that holds between equations (14) and (15), nor indeed between
the coeﬃcients on income in the micro- and macro-regressions, equations
(5) and (10). The theory does not deliver any general basis for comparing
estimated gradients atd i ﬀerent levels of aggregation.
Nevertheless, there are two polar cases in which the results are straight-
forward and are worth keeping in mind when interpreting the results.
These are (1) when the reference groups are small, and are contained
within the aggregation groups, and (2) when reference groups are univer-
sal, so that reference income z is the same for all people and equal to mean
income. Case 2 would arise if health is a function of relative income, but
all people are members of the same reference group, or if health is simply
af unction of absolute income rather than relative income. In these two
cases the gradients from micro- and macrodata can be compared. In Case
1, with individual data, the gradient will be the ratio of equation (8) to the
square root of equation (15), an attenuated but still positive eﬀect. In the
same case, but with aggregation group data, there will be no relationship
between aggregation group income and mortality, so that only inequality
matters. In case (2), when z is common to everyone, 2
z and zx are both
zero.I nthe individual-level data, by substituting 2
z 
 0, the ratio of equa-
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get, for the ratio of the slope in equation (10) to the square root of equa-
tion (14),
(17) 
   hc h 1
22 2 + /
,
where 2
c is the within-aggregation-group variance 2
	  2
x.P r obits run at
the aggregation group level will therefore be attenuated compared with
those run on the individual-level data. In our econometric analysis below,
/h from the microdata is around 0.3, while the mean within-cohort
variance of log income is about 0.6, so that the factor in the square root
of the denominator of equation (17) is 1.054, and the two sets of estimates
should be close.
What canb esaid about the relationship between inequality and the
probability of dying at the cohort or other group-aggregate level? The for-
mulas are suﬃciently complex to permit a wide variety of results. However,
if all the variances (and covariances) were to increase in proportion, which
is one way in which inequality might increase, there would be two distinct
eﬀects. The ﬁrst acts through the last term on the right-hand side of equa-
tion (10); when people are less healthy when they are lower in the reference
group, average health declines with inequality, and this eﬀecti sn ot altered
by the aggregation. The second eﬀectc an be seen by noting that the slope
in equation (10) is unaﬀected by a proportional change in variances, while
the variance in equation (14) will move with the other variances. This is
an aggregation eﬀect that, in the aggregate data, acts to attenuate further
the estimate of slope but, provided the probability of death is less than a
half, will raise the probability of death. When mortality risk is small, we
areo nthe convex portion of the relationship between the probability of
death and (log) income, so that Jensen’s inequality makes the aggregate
probability an increasing function of the variance. Of course, this eﬀect
could be weakened (or strengthened) by relaxing the original linearity as-
sumption between health and income. The possibility remains that
changes in inequality, by changing the ratio of zx to 2
x, will alter the slope
itself, but the formulas are complicated enough to prevent further con-
jecture.
4.3 Data and Results
Our empirical analysis is based on merging data on all-cause mortal-
ityf or the United States as a whole with data on incomes from the succes-
sive years 1975–95 from the 1976–96 CPS. (Note that the March CPS
collects data on the previous year’s income.) Merging is at the level of birth
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or women born in year b who died in year t,t othe incomes of that same
cohort in year t (or possibly earlier). The data on mortality are taken from
the Berkeley Mortality Database (BMD); we use the 1  1t a b l e ,i.e., frac-
tionsd ying by sex, by single year of age, and in each year from 1900 (see
Wilmoth 1999). The CPS data are used to attribute to each individual a
family income per adult equivalent, say, y,a nd we then calculate various
characteristics of the distribution of y over individuals for each birth co-
hort. In particular, we work with the cohort average of ln y,w i t hthe vari-
ance of the logarithm of y within the cohort, with the Gini coeﬃcient, and
with the proportion of people below the poverty line. Household income
is the CPS measure of total household income, and adult equivalents are
measured as the number of adults plus half the number of children, de-
ﬁned as those under eighteen years of age. Note that, although y is family
income per adult equivalent, identical values of which are assigned to all
members of each household, the mean and other statistics will generally
diﬀer by sex if, for example, women on average live in families with lower
income. We also use data on education from the CPS, calculating years of
education fore ach person, as well as dummies for various attainment lev-
els so that, at the cohort level, we have data on average years of education
as well as on the fraction who have graduated from high school, college,
and so on. After 1991, the CPS reports education in bracketed intervals
rather than in years. We use means within brackets from 1991 to attribute
years of education in the later surveys. With an age restriction from
twenty-ﬁve to eighty-ﬁve, and with CPS data from 1975 through 1995, our
data set consists of 1,281 age-year cohort averages.
Given that we have drawn a direct link from the theory at the individual
levelt oi ts implications for birth cohorts, estimation at the cohort level is
a viable alternative to estimation using individual records. Cohort data
also have some distinct advantages of their own, as well as some disadvan-
tages. On the positive side, because deaths are rare events, very large num-
bers of individuals need to be sampled to make individual data useful. By
contrast, the cohort data use the data on all deaths in the United States,
eliminating the need for sampling. Cohort data also overcome one of the
major diﬃculties in linking mortality to SES, which is the lack of
individual-level surveys that record adequate economic data together with
information on deaths. In this paper, we link mortality information from
the vital registration system with the CPS, which is probably the best
source of data on incomes and education. It would be possible to extend
this principle further, bringing in information on risk factors, such as
smoking, drinking, and obesity, from other sources, such as the Behavioral
Risk Factor Surveillance System, something we plan to do in our future
work.
There are also disadvantages of cohort data, primarily the impossibility
140 Angus Deaton and Christina Paxsonof separating genuine individual eﬀects from those that result from aggre-
gation. Using individual data that include community characteristics, we
could in principle test directly for eﬀects of community means or commu-
nity inequality, in addition to controlling for individual income. With ag-
gregate data, we have to face the problem of identifying the direct eﬀects
from the aggregation eﬀects, and such identiﬁcation will not always be
possible. One of our (subsidiary) aims in this paper is to assess the cohort
approach, and to test whether it yields results that are similar to those
from individual record data. If so, we will have more conﬁdence in using
it in situations where individual data cannot be used.
Figure 4.1 shows the log odds of dying, by age, for a selection of birth
cohorts born from 1870 through 1970. Although we can use only a fraction
of this information in the analysis, the long-run information is important
fori n terpreting recent events. One immediate feature of the patterns in
ﬁgure 4.1 is the age proﬁle of mortality. The risk of death is high immedi-
ately after birth, falls to low levels in the mid-teens, and then rises with
age thereafter. After about age thirty, the log odds of death is approxi-
mately linear in age (see also Elo and Preston 1996), albeit with a time-
dependent slope. Mortality has also been falling over time, so that the age
proﬁles for the later-born cohorts are below the proﬁles for those born
earlier. However, these two obvious features are far from exhausting these
data; the log odds are far from being completely explained by a sum of
age and cohort eﬀects. For example, there are clear traces of speciﬁc
events, such as the 1919 inﬂuenza pandemic on the cohort born in 1890.
Note also that the proportional reduction in mortality is larger at younger
ages—which in the limit must be true because everyone dies eventually—
but that the reductions diﬀer by sex; note for example the large reduction
in female mortality during child-bearing years. The reduction in mortality
among young males is much less than among young females, and for recent
cohorts, there has been little or no reduction in the mortality of males in
their early twenties. As a result, for the cohort born in 1973, the ratio of
mortality rates for males to females in 1995, at age twenty-two, is 3.25:1.
Forr ecent cohorts, male mortality rates fall with age from the early twen-
ties to the mid thirties. The causes of these deaths—violence, accidents,
and AIDS—are quite diﬀerent from those at higher ages, and it is implaus-
ible that a single explanation in terms of income and income inequality
will do for both.
Figure 4.2 shows the mortality data in a way that is more immediately
relevant to the task at hand. The graphs show estimated year and cohort
eﬀects in the log odds of mortality for males and females separately. These
ﬁgures use only the birth cohorts that are observed in at least one year
between 1975 and 1995 (inclusive), and that can therefore be matched to
the CPS data. Panel A shows the year eﬀects estimated from a regression
of the log odds of dying on a set of year and age dummies, one for each






















































































































































































































Byear and one for each year of age. Panel B is obtained in the same way,
butw ithc ohort (date of birth) eﬀects replacing year eﬀects. Panel A corre-
sponds to a ﬁtted model in which the age proﬁle remains constant, but
drifts down with time, so that all people alive at any given date beneﬁt
from that year’s reduction in mortality. It shows that the rate of mortality
decline was relatively rapid from 1975 through the early 1980s, but has
beenag oodd eal slower since then. The timing of the increase in income
inequality is not identical to the timing of the slowdown in mortality de-
cline; the largest increase took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and
the increase since then has been more modest. The cohort eﬀects in Panel
B do not tell a picture of continuing progress. In particular, males born
since 1950 show sharply higher mortality rates than those born in the
1940s. Note that those born most recently are observed only in the early
periods of their lives, so that these graphs give undue weight to the recent
mortality experience among young adults, for whom deaths are due to
violence, accidents, and AIDS, and thus do not share the long-run down-
ward trend.
Table 4.1 presents a ﬁrst seto fr esults focusing on the relationship be-
tween income and mortality. The dependent variable is the log odds of dy-
ing while the independent variables are dummy variables for each age from
twenty-ﬁve to eighty-ﬁve and the logarithm of income per adult equiva-
lent. Because the age eﬀects are removed, identiﬁcation comes from the
relationship between cohort (and interaction) components of mortality
and income less its age proﬁle. One hypothesis is that all of the trend re-
duction in mortality is potentially attributable to income, but the historical
and international evidence suggests that this is not the case (see, in particu-
lar, Preston 1975). In consequence, and in order to avoid the risk of spuri-
ousc orrelation between time trends, we present results with and without
the inclusion of a time trend. In the ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sionsi nthe upper half of the table, the coeﬃcient on the logarithm of
family income per equivalent is 0.559 for men, and 0.528 for women;
with the introduction of a time trend, these numbers become 0.281 and
0.125, respectively. Since the log odds is approximately the log-
probability when the probability is small, these estimates can be thought
of as elasticities. If the coeﬃcient were 0.5, a fourfold increase in income
would cut the risk of death in half.
In order to compare the cohort results with those from individual-level
data, we estimated logits for the probability of dying using the National
Longitudinal Mortality Study (NLMS). This is a survey of individuals
originally sampled in CPS surveys and in the census around 1980, into
which death certiﬁcates have been retrospectively merged. For all individ-
uals from age twenty-ﬁve to eighty-ﬁve, we constructed an indicator of
whether the individual had died within 365 days of the interview, and esti-
mated a logit model in which the independent variables are a set of age










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.dummies, one for each age, and the logarithm of real family income per
adult equivalent. (The public-use version of the NLMS provides only real-
income classes, not actual income, and we have used the classes to con-
struct a [rough] measure of the logarithm of total family income. We use
the 1981 CPS to calculate mean log income by age and sex within each of
the NLMS income brackets, using the results to impute log income to each
person in the NLMS within his or her reported income bracket. In prac-
tice, this gives very similar results to the simpler method of setting income
to the middle of the bracket. Adult equivalents were computed by linking
individuals to households and counting the numbers of adults and chil-
dren.) Figure 4.3 shows the one-year log odds of mortality from the
NLMS, computed from the fractions in the sample who died at each age,
together with the age proﬁle of the log odds of mortality from the BMD
for 1982. The NLMS mortality ﬁgures, which exclude deaths among the
institutionalized population, are somewhat lower among the elderly, al-
though the major eﬀecti sp resumably beyond age eighty-ﬁve and is noisier,
especially at young ages. However, the two data sets are clearly measuring
the same thing, so that the NLMS results are a useful comparison. The
coeﬃciento nthe (log) income term in the logit is 0.352 for men (161,472
observations, t 
 10.8) and 0.262 for women (177,953 observations, t 

6.3), close to the estimates in Elo and Preston (1996, using the same data
but a diﬀerent speciﬁcation). As we have seen, there are a number of rea-
sons that these numbers should not be the same as those in table 4.1. In ad-
dition to the aggregation issues, note that the NLMS records only a single
estimate of family income so that, if permanent income is a better pre-
dictor of mortality than current income, or if income is measured with
error, the NLMS estimate will be attenuated relative to the cohort based
estimates to the extent that averaging over cohorts limits measurement
error or proxies permanent income. Note also that the NLMS relates only
to income in a few years around 1980, so that the two sets of calculations
cover quite diﬀerent periods. Given this and the aggregation diﬀerences,
we ﬁnd the estimates surprisingly similar!
Table 4.1 shows a number of other results, including breakdowns by
age, and using two alternative instrumental variable strategies to estimate
the income eﬀect. In the four OLS columns, with results for four age
groups, we obtain the now-standard results that income matters most for
health in middle age, in the forty to ﬁfty-four age range, and that the eﬀect
diminishes with age. Even so, income is still protective for the oldest group
of both men and women, though the result vanishes (and indeed income
becomes mildly hazardous for women) if time trends are included in the
regressions. Perhaps most striking is the positive eﬀecto fincome on mor-
tality among young men; the eﬀecti sl arge and negative among young
women. This result is associated with the recent increase in mortality rates
among young men, which appears to be greater among cohorts with higher




































































































































Saverage incomes. Plausible arguments can be made for a positive associa-
tion between income and the speciﬁc causes of mortality in this age
group—AIDS, violence, and accidents—and there is good evidence from
pooled state and time series evidence that gives very similar results
(Ruhm 2000).
The way in which the protective eﬀecto fincome varies with age can
also be assessed directly, by entering age into the regressions not only in
levels, but also interacted with income. We have done this for both the
cohort and NLMS data, in the latter by running a logit on age dummies,
the log of income per adult equivalent, and on age dummies interacted
with the income term. The results are shown in graphical form in ﬁgure
4.4, for males in the left-hand panel and for females in the right-hand
panel. These graphs are noisy, particularly for the NLMS, which is to be
expected given the very large number of age coeﬃcients in the regressions.
Nevertheless, for women, we see the familiar pattern whereby protection
increases with age to around age forty-ﬁve and decreases thereafter. For
men, the two graphs are not the same. In particular, the cohort data again
show a positive association of mortality and income among young men, a
phenomenon of which there is no trace in the NLMS data. The obvious
explanation here is the fact that the NLMS measures mortality in the early
1980s, before the youth mortality phenomenon had become so pro-
nounced. More disappointing is the failure of the NLMS to show any
other age pattern; perhaps we are asking too much of single-year mortal-
ity data.
The instrumental variable (IV) estimates in table 4.1 are motivated by
an attempt to replace current income with a longer-term or permanent
measure. One strategy is to instrument income with years of education, on
the assumption that education does not aﬀecth e alth directly—a contro-
versial supposition that we shall investigate more directly below. Another
is to use cohort dummies as instruments; this would be correct if we
wanted to measure lifetime resources, which remain constant over time at
the cohort level. These instrumentation schemes are likely to work better
forp eople of working ages than for the elderly, whose current income is
lessw ell predicted by their education, and whose lifetime income will not
be adequately captured by averaging over the maximum of twenty years
in our sample. Nevertheless, the estimated income eﬀects move as would
be expected if long-run income is a better predictor of health than current
income. In the top half of the table, instrumentation of income by years of
education moves the coeﬃcient for men from 0.56 to 0.92, and for
women from 0.53 to 0.84. Instrumentation also removes much of the
diﬀerence between the estimates with and without time trends. Most re-
markably, when years of education (but not education and cohort dum-
mies) is used as an instrument, the protective eﬀecto fincome for young
men is restored. If this result is accepted—and there are reasons for not

















































































































































































Sdoing so, including the possible direct role of education, and the diﬀerent
result when cohort dummies are added to the set of instruments—it indi-
cates that mortality among young men is procyclical, again in line with
Ruhm’s (2000) result that unemployment is good for health.
Figure 4.5 shows one aspect of the partial correlation between ln y and
mortality. These graphs show the residuals of regressions of mortality,
years of education, and ln y on as et of age dummies, averaged over birth
cohorts in the top two panels, and over years in the bottom two panels.
The very clear inverse variation is clear for both men and women, as is the
fact that education is a very good predictor of income at the cohort level
(though less so on the time series), which helps in instrumentation but
which, in our later tests, will also make it diﬃcult to separate out the roles
of income and education on the cohort data. (Note that the regressions
contain more information than shown in the ﬁgures, since the observations
arec ohort-year pairs, with interactions, not cohort or year averages.)
Table 4.2 is similar to table 4.1, but with the addition of two within-
cohort inequality measures, the variance of log income and the Gini co-
eﬃcient. (These regressions were also run with time trends, but the results
are not much aﬀected.) The introduction of either the variance of log in-
come or the Gini coeﬃcient produces an estimated protective eﬀect of in-
equality on health. To see the size of the coeﬃcients, we note that, aver-
aged over all cohorts, log odds of male mortality declined by 0.20 from
1975 to 1995. The mean of the logarithm of income per adult income rose
by 0.20, and its variance by 0.196. Using the coeﬃcients for all age groups
combined, then the rise in income equal would be predicted to reduce the
log odds by about half of the actual decline, 0.10 (OLS) and 0.12 (IV).
Ther ise in the variance would lead to a decline in the log odds of death
by 0.03 (OLS) and (an absurd) 0.12 (IV). The changes in mortality, income,
and inequality were much the same for females as for males, but the co-
eﬃcientsare diﬀerent. The predicted eﬀecto fthe rise in income is a decline
in the log odds of female mortality of 0.08 (OLS) and 0.07 (IV), while the
predicted declines from the increase in inequality are 0.03 (OLS) and 0.11
(IV). In the four OLS regressions (men versus women, variance of logs
versus Gini), the introduction of the inequality measure has very little
eﬀecto nthe income coeﬃcient, which remains protective as before, but in
all cases the inequality measure appears with a signiﬁcant negative co-
eﬃcient. The protective eﬀecto finequality is about the same for males
and females, and is a good deal larger for people aged thirty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-
nine than for those aged sixty and over. For the elderly, the estimated co-
eﬃciento nthe Gini is insigniﬁcantly or barely signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero.W hile the theory allows for the possibility that inequality is protec-
tive—for example, if individuals look to the bottoms of their reference
groups in assessing their health, or if the covariance of mean cohort and
mean reference group income is large enough—the result remains im-
plausible.







































































































































































DFigure 4.6 provides some insight into the source of these results, as well
as an explanation for the diﬀerence with Deaton (2001), whose similar
regressions yielded essentially no eﬀect. The top two panels of the ﬁgure
show the raw income inequality data, on the left for the Gini coeﬃcient
and on the right for the variance of logarithms. Each of these has a male
Table 4.2 Log Odds of Dying as a Function of Income and Income Inequality by
Age Group
Men Women
OLS IV OLS IV
Inequality Measure Is Variance of ln(y/ae)
All age groups
mean ln(y/ae) 0.520 0.606 0.479 0.417
(22.7) (8.1) (26.2) (4.5)
var ln(y/ae) 0.157 0.655 0.180 0.656
(8.7) (4.9) (13.6) (5.1)
Ages 35–59
mean ln(y/ae) 0.621 1.368 0.726 0.307
(14.6) (4.9) (26.2) (1.5)
var ln(y/ae) 0.236 0.353 0.240 1.066
(8.0) (1.0) (11.4) (3.9)
Ages 60–85
mean ln(y/ae) 0.506 0.594 0.298 0.380
(21.6) (9.4) (15.9) (5.7)
var ln(y/ae) 0.123 0.475 0.084 0.375
(5.7) (3.3) (5.7) (3.0)
Inequality Measure Is Gini Coeﬃcient of y/ae
All age groups
mean ln(y/ae) 0.505 0.596 0.440 0.631
(20.3) (8.0) (21.7) (12.4)
Gini y/ae 0.525 2.910 0.819 1.522
(5.5) (5.1) (10.5) (5.2)
Ages 35–59
mean ln(y/ae) 0.504 1.370 0.625 0.588
(10.6) (6.6) (18.9) (3.4)
Gini y/ae 1.563 1.476 1.398 2.624
(8.3) (1.4) (9.8) (2.8)
Ages 60–85
mean ln(y/ae) 0.518 0.694 0.308 0.435
(20.3) (15.3) (15.1) (7.0)
Gini y/ae 0.154 0.870 0.105 1.514
(1.5) (2.4) (1.2) (2.2)
Sources: See table 4.1.
Notes: Each regression includes the mean of the logarithm of household income per adult
equivalent (mean ln[y/ae]),aseto fa ge dummies, and an inequality measure. The instrumen-
tal variable (IV) estimates instrument mean ln(y/ae)a nd the inequality measure with the
mean years of schooling, and the fraction of people in education categories. The education
categories are years of schooling equal to 5–8, 9–11, 12, 13–15, and 16 or more. Years of
education from 0 to 4 is the omitted category. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.













































.and a female variant because we use the CPS data to assign (the same)
family income per equivalent to each person in the household, so that
diﬀerences in inequality by sex reﬂect the distribution of men and women
across households. As far as trends are concerned, there is no important
diﬀerence by sex. Note also that the inequality measures are not the usual
inequality measures for the whole country, but the average over all the
cohorts in a given year of the inequality measure within the cohort. Such
measures exclude the contribution of between cohort inequality to the na-
tional aggregate. Even so, the trends are similar to the national trends.
Family income inequality rises rapidly from the late 1970s to the mid
1980s, with relatively little change thereafter. (The sharp increase in the
Gini in 1995 is not mirrored in the variance of logs, because it is associated
with inequality at the very top of the distribution, and is probably distorted
by top-coding eﬀects and by other changes in interview protocols.)
Theb ottom panels of the ﬁgure are constructed by calculating the resid-
uals of the regression of the log odds of death on age eﬀects and on the
mean of log income per equivalent, averaging by year, and plotting them
against the similarly averaged residuals of the inequality measure on age
eﬀects and the mean of log income per equivalent. Without the averaging,
the regression of the mortality residuals on the inequality residuals would
reproduce the coeﬃcients in table 4.2, and the averaging is used only to
produce uncluttered graphs. The negative (partial) relationship between
inequality and mortality is transparent in both ﬁgures. When inequality
wasl ow,m o rtality was high (and falling), and when inequality was high,
mortality was low. The timing of mortality change and income inequality
in the United States is not supportive of the hypothesis that inequality
increases the risk of death in the aggregate. The estimated protective eﬀect
of inequality is reduced if time trends are included in the regression, but
neither the sign nor the statistical signiﬁcance is altered. Nor are the re-
sults aﬀected by introducing one- or two-period lags between inequality
and mortality.
Table 4.2 also shows the consequences of instrumenting both inequality
and income, on the same grounds as before: that it is possibly the long-
term experience of high income and high inequality, not their year-to-year
variations, that conditions mortality. Also as before, we use education as
instruments, not only the mean years of education in the cohort, but also
the fractions of the cohort with various educational attainment levels. The
inclusion of the latter captures the distribution of educational attainment
within the cohort, and generates excellent instruments for income inequal-
ity. Generally, the results are what might be expected, that moving to a
long-term basis reduces attenuation and makes the estimates absolutely
larger, for both mean income and inequality. There is one exception, for
men aged thirty-nine to ﬁfty-nine, where the protective eﬀecto finequality
is reversed, so that we get the (originally expected) positive coeﬃcient,
154 Angus Deaton and Christina Paxsonthough for neither the Gini nor the variance of logs is the estimate signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero. (One line of investigation that needs to be pur-
sued withd i ﬀerent data is the extent to which these results reﬂect mortality
among young men, and its relationship to the business cycle on the one
hand, and with income in the cross-section through AIDS, an eﬀect that
has almost certainly changed sign over time.)
Table 4.3 investigates another possibility that is often raised in the litera-
ture, that the eﬀects of inequality might be a mistaken attribution of the
eﬀects of poverty. The ﬁrst two rows of the table show the OLS and IV
results for men and women, ﬁrst including only the fraction of people be-
low the oﬃcial U.S. poverty line, and in the next row, including both the
fraction who are poor and the variance of log income. These results serve
merely to deepen the puzzle. Poverty, like inequality, is estimated to be
Table 4.3 Poverty and Interactions between Income and Inequality
Men Women
OLS IV OLS IV
mean ln(y/ae) 0.646 1.101 0.670 0.970
(25.0) (24.3) (33.6) (34.0)
Fraction poor 0.825 1.774 1.181 1.447
(7.1) (5.4) (15.2) (7.0)
mean ln(y/ae) 0.580 0.688 0.603 0.700
(21.1) (2.9) (28.7) (4.9)
var ln(y/ae) 0.125 0.552 0.117 0.333
(6.4) (1.8) (8.4) (1.9)
Fraction poor 0.490 0.321 0.884 0.853
(3.9) (0.4) (10.6) (2.3)
mean ln(y/ae) 0.263 0.274 0.215 0.261
(5.5) (1.8) (5.2) (2.4)
var ln(y/ae) 4.165 8.191 3.769 3.215
(5.9) (2.3) (6.7) (1.7)
mean * var 0.474 0.929 0.438 0.413
(6.1) (6.1) (7.0) (7.0)
∂/∂mean ln(y/ae) 0.539 0.815 0.485 0.515
(23.6) (7.7) (27.0) (5.6)
∂/∂var ln(y/ae) 0.160 0.299 0.188 0.518
(9.0) (1.6) (14.3) (4.0)
Sources: See table 4.1.
Notes: Each regression also includes a set of age dummies. The IV estimates instrument
mean ln(y/ae), poverty, and inequality with the mean years of schooling, and the fraction
of people in diﬀerent education categories. The education categories are years of school-
ing equal to 5–8, 9–11, 12, 13–15, and 16 or more. Years of education from 0 to 4 is the
omitted category. The derivatives are evaluated at the sample means of var ln(y/ae)a n d
mean ln(y/ae), respectively. The means for var ln(y/ae)a re 0.583 (men) and 0.617 (women).
The means for mean ln(y/ae)a re 9.135 (men) and 9.039 (women). Numbers in parentheses
are t-statistics.
Mortality, Education, Income, and Inequality 155protective of health, and when both poverty and inequality are included,
both are separately protective.
The last row of the table investigates whether the slope of the gradient
between income and mortality is aﬀected by mortality. As we saw in the
theoretical development, except when we observe individual and reference
group income, the eﬀecto fincome on health is a function of inequality,
and is predicted to increase with general increases in inequality in the
individual-level data if such changes increase within-group inequality
more than between-group inequality. In the cohort data, the same eﬀect is
caused by an increase in the variance of aggregation group income relative
to reference group income, which is itself a plausible consequence of an
increase in within-reference-group inequality. (For example, see equation
[11], and take z 

 t and x 
 a 
 t,s othat increases in the
variance 2
a will simultaneously increase the slope of the gradient as well
as the ratio of within-reference-group to between-reference-group inequal-
ity.)T he interaction terms in the third section of the table are estimated to
be negative, so that the gradient of mortality with income is steeper when
inequality is larger. This is again a plausible result, but it does not remove
the implausible (and signiﬁcant) protective eﬀecto finequality at the mean
(see the derivatives at the bottom of the table).
In the results so far, we have adopted the position that the underlying
determinant of health is income rather than education, and have used edu-
cation to instrument income and income inequality. This is a controversial
position, however; many would argue that it is not income, but educa-
tion—or at least some personal attribute that is strongly related to educa-
tion—that is the ultimate determinant of health. It is also possible, in the
immediate context, that our misspeciﬁcation of the role of education is
responsible for our unexpected results on the role of inequality. Americans
have been becoming more educated on average, and the rate of return to
education has been rising,s othat changes in income inequality are due in
part to changes in the relationship between income and education.
Before looking at the cohort data, it is worth using the individual-level
data in the NLMS to give another assessment of income versus education,
and one that is not aﬀected by the time series eﬀects that are potentially
important in the cohort data. Table 4.4 shows results from logit estimation
of the probability of death on men and women in the NLMS within a year
of interview. Age eﬀects by single years of age were included but are not
shown. In the ﬁrst row are the results already discussed, on the eﬀects of
the logarithm of income per adult equivalent on the log odds of dying.
Thes econd row shows what happens if we replace income by years of
education; like income, education has a strong and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
mortality; an additional ﬁve years of education, from, say, high school to
a master’s degree, reduced the probability of death by around 20 percent
form en and about 25 percent for women. In the ﬁnal row of the table, the
logits are run with both education and income. For men, the income co-
156 Angus Deaton and Christina Paxsoneﬃcienti sr educed hardly at all, while the coeﬃcient on education is re-
duced threefold, and is no longer signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Ac-
cording to these estimates, to a ﬁrst approximation, it is income, not educa-
tion, that is protective of health. These results are not replicated for
women, whose combined regression shows eﬀects of both income and edu-
cation separately, each protective, and each with a coeﬃcient somewhat
smaller than when they are included alone.
Income is much less well predicted by education for women than for
men, but this does not explain why it is income, not education, that plays
the dominant role in male mortality. Although others in the literature have
found that income drives out education—see Lantz et al. (1998), who use
the (much smaller) American Changing Lives Survey, which also allows
controls for behavioral factors—we ﬁnd the result quite surprising. Even
if it is ultimately income that matters, it is astonishing that a single obser-
vation of ay ear’s income, with all the usual measurement error, should
predict mortality better than a longer-term measure as predicted by educa-
tion,i nw hich case both income and education should show up in the
reduced form regression. The obvious possibility is that there is causality
running from health to income for people about to die. There is some
evidence for this in the results reported by Elo and Preston (1996), who
also ﬁnd marked reductions in the education eﬀects on ﬁve-year mortality
when income is introduced, with reductions larger for men. However, even
after allowing for income—and for a range of other covariates, but with
age eﬀects restricted to entering linearly—male education is still signiﬁ-
cant,a nd twice as large as in table 4.4.
Tables 4.5 (men) and 4.6 (women) report results from the NLMS is the









Years of Education 0.0121 0.0336
(1.8) (3.8)
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NLMS.
Notes: Coeﬃcients from logit regressions in which dependent variable is whether the respon-
dent died within 365 days of interview. A full set of age dummies, one for each year from
twenty-ﬁve to eighty-ﬁve, are included but not shown. There are 161,472 males in the sample
and 183,282 females. The income and education variables are entered separately (the ﬁrst
two rows) and then together (last two rows). Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
Mortality, Education, Income, and Inequality 157same format as in table 4.4, but using deaths in periods at various lengths
after the interview; in the ﬁrst column for death in the ﬁrst year, as in table
4.4, in the second column for the second year, the third column between
two to ﬁve years after the interview, and in the last column, for deaths
from ﬁve to nine years after the interview. (For the results in the second,
third, and fourth columns, the logits are estimated only over the group of
individuals who survived to the beginning of the period, so that the
samples become successively smaller across the panels.) Although moving
forward in time will not eliminate the eﬀect of prospective deatho nin-
come—some conditions will produce low income for many years prior to
death—it should certainly reduce the inﬂuence of reverse causality. And
indeed, the results in the table are supportive of such an interpretation.
Form en under sixty, in the last two lines under heading A, the eﬀects of
Table 4.5 Eﬀects of Income and Schooling on Male Mortality, National
Longitudinal Mortality Study (logits)
Died in Died in Died in Died in
0–1 Years 1–2 Years 2–5 Years 5–9 Years
A. Men Aged 25–59 at Time of Survey
ln(y/ae) 0.456 0.397 0.415 0.325
(8.14) (7.32) (14.01) (13.43)
Years school 0.072 0.054 0.076 0.063
(5.70) (4.47) (11.62) (11.85)
ln(y/ae) 0.390 0.357 0.328 0.248
(6.25) (5.94) (9.95) (9.24)
Years school 0.035 0.021 0.045 0.040
(2.50) (1.55) (6.27) (6.81)
N 123,806 123,298 122,740 120,811
Number of deaths 508 558 1,929 3,059
B. Men Aged 60–85 at Time of Survey
ln(y/ae) 0.302 0.197 0.224 0.202
(7.62) (5.10) (9.43) (9.29)
Years school 0.028 0.034 0.028 0.026
(4.06) (5.14) (6.73) (6.62)
ln(y/ae) 0.285 0.138 0.191 0.172
(6.54) (3.23) (7.26) (7.11)
Years school 0.007 0.024 0.013 0.012
(0.88) (3.26) (2.91) (2.75)
N 37,666 36,123 34,514 29,705
Number of deaths 1,543 1,609 4,809 6,061
Sources: See table 4.4.
Notes: Form en aged twenty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine, age at the year of the survey was also included.
Form en aged sixtyt oe ighty-ﬁve, a complete set of age dummies was included. The sample
fore ach logit includes individuals who either died in the time period at the head of column
or died later; individuals who died earlier than the time period speciﬁed are excluded. Num-
bers in parentheses are t-statistics.
158 Angus Deaton and Christina Paxsoneducation on the log odds hold fairly steady, but the eﬀects of income
are reduced. Some such eﬀecti salso to be expected from the increasing
irrelevance of an increasingly remote measure of income, so it is not clear
how much of the reduction should be attributed to reverse causality. For
women, however, in table 4.6, where the reverse causality is weaker, the
initial income estimates are lower, and are less aﬀected as the mortality
window is moved forward. On this evidence, while the initial male estimate
of 0.4 is probably too large (in absolute value), a case can be made for
defending an estimate of around 0.3. Even for the elderly, and even ﬁve
to nine years after interview, income exerts a protective eﬀecta gainst mor-
tality, and the eﬀecti sn ot removedb yc ontrolling for education.
Thec ohortd ataa re perhaps less well suited to investigating the question
of whether it is income or education that matters for health. As we saw in
Table 4.6 Eﬀects of Income and Schooling on Female Mortality, National
Longitudinal Mortality Study (logits)
Died in Died in Died in Died in
0–1 Years 1–2 Years 2–5 Years 5–9 Years
A. Women Aged 25–59 at Time of Survey
ln(y/ae) 0.409 0.340 0.344 0.332
(5.75) (4.78) (9.03) (11.41)
Years school 0.076 0.060 0.066 0.065
(4.13) (3.26) (6.74) (8.66)
ln(y/ae) 0.348 0.296 0.287 0.276
(4.41) (3.75) (6.80) (8.54)
Years school 0.037 0.027 0.035 0.035
(1.82) (1.34) (3.16) (4.17)
N 134,355 134,041 133,721 132,581
Number of deaths 314 320 1,140 1,995
B. Women Aged6 0 – 8 5at Time of Survey
ln(y/ae) 0.190 0.074 0.174 0.133
(3.75) (1.52) (6.50) (6.01)
Years school 0.042 0.017 0.024 0.019
(4.67) (1.96) (4.95) (4.56)
ln(y/ae) 0.118 0.044 0.145 0.111
(2.16) (0.84) (5.01) (4.60)
Years school 0.034 0.014 0.014 0.011
(3.50) (1.49) (2.64) (2.37)
N 48,927 47,900 46,789 42,789
Number of deaths 1,027 1,111 4,000 6,202
Sources: See table 4.4.
Notes: Forw omen aged twenty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine, age at the year of the survey was also in-
cluded. For women aged sixty to eighty-ﬁve, a complete set of age dummies was included.
The sample for each logit includes individuals who either died in the time period at the head
of column or died later; individuals who died earlier than the time period speciﬁed are ex-
cluded. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
Mortality, Education, Income, and Inequality 159ﬁgure 4.5, the cohort average of the mean of the logarithm of income per
equivalent adult is closely related to the mean years of education, even
after removing age eﬀects from both. As a result, attempts to include both
variables in the cohort regressions lead to a good deal of instability in the
results. Nevertheless, the cohort data allow us to investigate the possibility
that there are dynamic eﬀects of income on mortality, with diﬀerences in
short- and long-run responses. Table 4.7 shows the results of trying to in-
vestigate education versus income, and the eﬀects on the estimates of vari-
ance. The ﬁrst two rows, labeled “Regression 1,” shows the results of OLS
regressions on age eﬀects and on mean income and mean years of educa-
tion.F or both men and women, and whether or not time trends are in-
cluded, income is either hazardous (or insigniﬁcant), and education is pro-
tective. Theabsenceofaprotectiveroleforincomeisinsharpcontradiction
to the cross-sectional results from the NLMS, and for males, that educa-
tion drives out income is exactly the opposite of the NLMS result. That
income might actually be harmful once education has been controlled for
has been argued by Fuchs (1974, 1993) and by Garber (1989), but the
studies cited either do not support the conclusion (Grossman 1975; Leigh
1983; Newhouse and Friedlander 1980), or are unpersuasive, as in Auster,
Leveson, and Sarachek (1969), who estimate regressions across states in
1960 with results that are frequently statistically insigniﬁcant and that are
notr obust across speciﬁcations. What is more plausible is the existence of
dynamic eﬀects, whereby mortality is positively related to transitory in-
come and (positively) follows the business cycle, but is negatively related
to permanent income. (There is a parallel here with the argument that
“new” causes of mortality—cigarette smoking, obesity, lack of exercise,
AIDS—ﬁrst aﬀect the rich but eventually settle down into the traditional
pattern of diﬀerentially harming the poor. Income brings health risks in
the short run, but ultimately the also the ability to understand and over-
come them.) Even so, we must note that these results are not very robust;
the correlation between the two parameter estimates is 0.80 for men and
0.78 for women. Instrumental variable results using cohort dummies as
instruments (not shown here) show very diﬀerent (and sometimes bizarre)
patterns. Clearly, much work remains to be done, perhaps with data that
are lessc o llinear than those used here.
Table 4.7 also shows the results of entering education, not as average
yearso fe ducation, but as the proportions of the population with various
levels of educational attainment (“Regression 2”). These results do not
diﬀer in any major way from those in regression 1; the estimated eﬀects of
income on mortality are still positive or insigniﬁcant, and education is
strongly protective, especially years of education beyond high school. In-
terestingly, those with “some college,” shown here as thirteen to ﬁfteen
yearso fs chool, are consistently at higher risk of mortality than those with
only ah i gh-school diploma. (This eﬀect, possibly attributable to selection,


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.also reappears in the NLMS, albeit in a much weaker form; see Elo and
Preston 1996). Apart from this, there is no evidence here that there is a
problem with using mean years of education to predict mortality. In the
ﬁnal regression in the table, regression 3, we repeat the ﬁrst regression but
with the addition of the variance of the logarithm of income per adult
equivalent. The coeﬃcients on inequality are much reduced compared
with those in table 4.2, typically by a factor of more than two, but the
estimated protective eﬀectr e mains. Allowing for the possible separate
eﬀects of education and income much reduces the size of the estimated
protective eﬀecto finequality, but it does not eliminate it.
4.4 Conclusions
Our original purpose was to use birth-cohort data to examine the links
between mortality and inequality. Controlling for income, we ﬁnd that
higher inequality is associated with lower mortality, a conclusion that
comes from negative association of mortality and inequality in the United
States in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While it is possible that such a
result has some real basis—and there are theoretical mechanisms that
could produce it—it is hardly established by these results. In particular,
the sign of the eﬀecti si m plausible, if only because of the expected opera-
tion of Jensen’s inequality, and the magnitude of the eﬀect isq u i te sensitive
to the way in which other variables are introduced, particularly income
and education. Indeed, we suspect that the current priority should not be
the investigation of the eﬀects of inequality, but the unpacking of “socio-
economic status” into its components, particularly education and income,
as well as the disaggregation of mortality into its diﬀerent components so
as to allow them to respond to income and education in diﬀerent ways.
Ther e sults reported here make it clear that this is no easy task; the way
in which education and income aﬀectm o rtality is not the same for men as
forw omen,n or fory oung adults as for older adults; it is diﬀerent over long
time periods and over the business cycle, and it is diﬀerent in the cross-
section from over time. We ﬁnd evidence that short-term increases of in-
come may raise the risk of mortality, particularly for young men. In the
cohort data, however, the longer-term eﬀects of income, or of income
linked to education, are protective. Yet this evidence needs to be recon-
ciled with the individual-level data from the follow-up studies, which show
that, especially for men, income plays a role as large as or larger than that
of education.W orko nthese issues has hardly begun.
162 Angus Deaton and Christina PaxsonAppendix
In the text, we make repeated use of a standard result from the normal
distribution, which is stated here for convenience. In words, if two variable
are jointly normally distributed, the conditional expectation of one given
the other—the regression function—is linear and homoscedastic, with co-
eﬃcients and residual variance equal to the coeﬃcients and residual vari-
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Comment James P. Smith
This is a very good paper—but staying within the spirit of the thesis ad-
vanced here, very good relative to what? We clearly are in need of a refer-
ence group. The reference group could be all economic papers written dur-
ing the last ten years, but, alas, that would be faint praise indeed. Another
reference group could be all the papers delivered at this NBER economics
of aging conference, but given my desire to receive an invitation to the
next conference in this splendid Boulders setting I will not go down that
particular route. Perhaps it would be safer to stay close to home and simply
compare this paper to all joint papers of Deaton and Paxson. If I rank it
toward the top, however, will Angus and Chris think that I do not like
their other papers all that much? If I place it toward the bottom, will they
feel that I really don’t regard this as an important contribution? The very
process of ranking clearly creates psychosocial stress, which may be an
additional piece of evidence that they are onto something quite important.
The truth of the matter is that this is an outstanding paper no matter
what the reference group is. There is an exploding literature on the rela-
tionship between economic inequality and health. The reasoning behind
James P. Smith is a senior economist at RAND Corporation.
Mortality, Education, Income, and Inequality 165the assumed relationship takes many forms, but one of most prominent
variants states that through psychosocial stress mechanisms, inequality is
ah e alth risk for those at the bottom of the social pecking order. This is
clearly an important scientiﬁc topic that needs original and balanced
thinking and testing. Unfortunately, a good deal of the existing work is
heavily ideological (by proponents and opponents alike) with a compelling
desire to prove (or disprove) a result.
One reason ideology has such free rein is that the theory beyond the link
between economic inequality and health has, to date, almost no formal
structure, so that it is unclear how one could rigorously test (in the sense
of rejecting) the hypothesis. The absence of structure appears in many
forms, butp erhaps the most important concerns the reference group.
Without specifying what the appropriate reference group is, the theory is
nott e stable. Advocates of the link between economic inequality and
health status have been all over the map on the correct reference group—
nation, state, neighborhood, birth cohort, fellow economists—would be
onlyap artial list of options used. Some researchers simply go back and
forth among them picking out whatever happens to be consistent with the
particular result of the moment.
The lack of consensus about the appropriate reference group is not sur-
prising. All choices seem quite ad hoc, justiﬁed mainly by casual intuition.
As soon as you convince yourself that one option makes sense, you easily
think of a dozen ﬂaws in the argument. In my view, the inherent arbitrari-
ness involved in selection of an appropriate reference group has been the
main stumbling block in making new scientiﬁc advances on the link be-
tween inequality and health.
The powerful insight that motivates the Deaton-Paxson paper is that
the authors do not have to prespecify any particular reference group. In-
stead, they argue that all data contain variation in economic status that is
partly within-reference-group variance and partly variance across refer-
ence groups. The health–economic status (however measured) gradient
that emerges then depends on how much of the variation in economic
status is within rather than across reference groups. For example, suppose
only relative (to the median) rank matters. If all variation in economic
status is across reference groups, there would be no health–economic sta-
tus gradient at all. If instead all dispersion in economic status is within
reference groups, the health–economic status gradient may be quite steep.
More generally, the greater the extent to which economic status varia-
tion is within rather than between reference groups, the steeper the social
health gradient will be. This insight may help explain the old puzzle of
why the health–grade of employment gradient was steeper in the Whitehall
sample of civil servants than it appeared to be in the population at large
(Marmot et al. 1991). Based on the same reasoning, one would also specu-
late that the health gradient would be steeper in data from small towns
166 Angus Deaton and Christina Paxsonthan for the nation as a whole. To my knowledge, that particular idea has
not been tested, but the general framework outlined by Deaton and Pax-
son suggests that any time we can narrow variation to within-reference-
group variance, the social health gradient should be steeper.
This formal structure provided by Angus and Chris as a way of thinking
about the eﬀects of inequality on health is extremely important and will
have a major impact on the ﬁeld. As an aside, I must admit that I prefer
their earlier speciﬁcation, which ranks relative to the median rather than
what seems like their current favorite, relative to the top dog. In the top-
dog model, everyone’s health will deteriorate if the wealthiest person gets
richer. That seems a particularly dreary view of human nature, although I
must admit that there are some economic departments that seem to ﬁt it.
However, their contribution is not yet done. Another important insight
comes from their discussion of the implications of aggregation. Rather
than simply jumping to test the model on data aggregated into birth co-
horts, in typical fashion, they ﬁrst work out analytically the implications
of doing so. It turns out that the type of aggregation matters a lot in testing
the implications of the theory of the eﬀects of economic inequality on
health. Deaton and Paxson demonstrate that what happens to the slope
of the social health gradient depends on the ﬁneness of the reference group
relative to the ﬁneness of the aggregation. For example, if the reference
group is very broad (say, the nation) relative to aggregation across groups,
the relation between health and income will be preserved. If instead the
reference group is narrow relative to any aggregation, the health-income
relation can be lost completely.
This is an important insight with signiﬁcant implications for interpreting
the vast number of existing studies on this topic. In some ways, the authors
may not be making enough of this idea, which can be used to evaluate
whether a particular group is a likely candidate for a reference group. For
example, in their own work, they ﬁnd a preserved relation suggesting that
reference groups are much broader than birth cohorts, which further sug-
gests that something akin to nations may be close to the mark.
Thes econdp arto fthe paper shifts gears and becomes decidedly empir-
ical. This part of the paper has the attribute in applied work that I most
value. After reading their paper, I believe I know pretty much everything
that such data aggregated across cohorts will tell us about the relationship
between economic status and health. The reasons I feel so informed are
that Chris and Angus leave no stone unturned and that they believe in full
disclosure. We are told about all results whether they conform to priors or
not, and we are also informed about the robustness of the main ﬁndings.
That is how scientiﬁc progress is eventually possible and is a step toward
restoring the good name of applied work.
What are their principal ﬁndings? First, they report that income is pro-
tective of health (higher income leads to improvements in health). Some-
Mortality, Education, Income, and Inequality 167what surprisingly, they ﬁnd that income may be more protective of health
than education is, which certainly runs counter to the accepted wisdom
on this subject. This ﬁnding is intriguing and fortunately Deaton and Pax-
son plan to do more work on this important topic.
There is another relation implicit here that they do not emphasize at
all, which may be even more surprising—your kids will kill you! In their
empirical speciﬁcation, economic resources of the household are deﬁned
as adjusted household income in which the adjustment is an equivalence
scale correction where adults are counted as one and children as one-half.
Household economic resources can decline either because household in-
come falls or because there are more children present—both have the iden-
tical eﬀecto fr educing health. Without getting into a debate about the
theoretical justiﬁcation of doing an equivalence scale adjustment (which I
personally do not ﬁnd plausible), there is a legitimate concern about how
much of the protective eﬀecto fincome comes through the numerator
(household income) and how much through the denominator (family size).
This is an especially relevant concern given how much variation in family
size exists during this time period. During these years, variation in family
size stems not only from the signiﬁcant variation over life cycles as families
aref ormed, but also from the fact that these data span the years of both
the baby boom and, especially, the sharp baby bust. Since it is testable
whether income or family size is driving their results, at a minimum they
should provide such tests by separately entering into their empirical mod-
els the numerator (income) and the denominator (family size). I doubt that
they will have equivalent eﬀects.
There is another issue regarding the protective eﬀecto fincome on
health lurking in the background. While Deaton and Paxson mention a
number of times the possibility of reverse causation from health to income,
af ull accounting of the impact of income on health is not possible without
taking reverse causation into account. For example, in a recent paper
(Smith 1999), I show that the full correlation between income and health
among men in their ﬁfties is due to the eﬀecto fh e alth on income, leaving
nothing left over for income to aﬀecth ealth. A good deal of the association
between health and income apparently is reverse causation. Unless reverse
causation is isolated and controlled, one must be extremely cautious before
interpreting any age or gender patterns that emerge on the protective eﬀect
of income on health.
Second, and perhaps even more shocking to them, they ﬁnd that income
inequality is also protective! Your health is better if you live in a very
unequal society. Of course, this runs counter to the spirit, letter, and the
law of the hypothesis advance by Wilkinson (1996) and others and will
certainly be greeted with much dismay. Angus and Chris do not accept
this result at face value, ﬁnding it implausible, but they never really make
it disappear. Before talking about why it may not be so surprising empiri-
168 Angus Deaton and Christina Paxsoncally to ﬁnd this result in the recent U.S. experience, one should stop for a
moment and ask whether ﬁnding income inequality to be protective is any
more implausible than ﬁnding inequality to be harmful for health. If one
were to decide, based only on the implications for one’s own health, be-
tween living in two societies that were identical, except that the top 25 per-
cent in the economic hierarchy had higher incomes in one society, which
would one choose? I would favor the society where the top 25 percent had
higher incomes (and thus more inequality). Those very rich people with
fearsf or their own mortality might invest more in medical research or
hospitals seeking a cure to spare them at least for a while from some
dreaded diseases. These investments are very much in the nature of public
goods so I should beneﬁt from them as well. Now, I would not push this
argument very strongly since the most likely outcome (until there is strong
evidence otherwise) is that my health would be the same in both societies.
At this point, however, I do not think we should have strong directional
priors about the impact of inequality on health.
Whatevero ur theoretical expectations, is it empirically surprising to ﬁnd
that rising inequality is correlated with better health in recent U.S. history?
I think not. Before coming to that, I would like to raise a related point.
Deaton and Paxson’s mortality measure includes death from all causes,
butIthink that the inequality hypothesis with its emphasis on psychoso-
cial stress deals principally with mortality from only a subset of causes,
such as deaths related to heart disease. For example, the inequality hypoth-
esis has little to do with deaths from AIDS. To explain AIDS-related
deaths, we want to understand the causes of the spread of HIV through
unprotected sex and unsanitary needles among drug users. It would be a
real stretch to believe that AIDS-related deaths had much to do with rising
economic inequality. Therefore, a more relevant test of the inequality hy-
pothesis would limit mortality to certain diseases, with heart disease being
the most prominent.
Heart disease is an interesting case since it is generally agreed that, at
least among adults, reduction in mortality from heart disease is the major
reason for the recent extension in the length of life. However, the reasons
forh eart disease–related improvements in life expectancy appear to be
related to new drug treatments for hypertension, better health behaviors
(especially exercise and diet), and new surgical procedures following heart
attacks. Who would seriously argue that this heart disease–related im-
provement in life expectancy was due to lower economic inequality?
As we know, economic inequality in the United States was not falling
during these years, but was increasing rather sharply. The sharpest drops
in mortality reported by Deaton and Paxson took place during the mid-
1970s to early 1980s—the very years when economic inequality was rising
most rapidly (and income was relatively constant). It should come as no
surprise, then, that data based on the U.S. experience will produce a posi-
Mortality, Education, Income, and Inequality 169tive correlation between inequality and health. As I argued above, the rea-
sons for this correlation lie outside the inequality-health transmission
mechanism which at best can be only a bit player in a much larger story.
What then do I take from the empirical work in this ﬁne paper? My
bottom-line conclusion is that this organization of the data with aggrega-
tion across birth cohorts or calendar year is unlikely to answer conclusively
the question of the eﬀecto fe conomic inequality on health, or possibly
evenw hether income or education is more protective for health. I do not
regard this as a negative assessment of the value of the work presented
here. Much of the evidence by others purporting to demonstrate the eﬀects
of inequality on health is based on some type of data aggregation. After
reading Deaton and Paxson’s paper, I would regard such evidence with a
good deal more skepticism. That is contribution enough for any paper.
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